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Constitutional Law:
Reliance on Nonenforcement
Zachary S. Price1
When, if ever, may private parties rely on official assurances that
federal law will not apply to them? This question arises in a bewildering
array of contexts, from humdrum to monumental. At the most everyday
level, federal park police might promise to allow parking in a no-parking
zone only to return with a ticket, or harried Internal Revenue Service
personnel might provide mistaken guidance on how to complete a tax
return. But other assurances are more consequential. Federal law
enforcement and intelligence officials may promise undercover agents
immunity from prosecution for joining a criminal operation as a means
of uncovering crimes; some federal agencies issue no-action letters or
advisory opinions indicating that planned conduct will not be punished;
and a panoply of administrative agencies issue enforcement policies
indicating how they plan to enforce the many detailed statutes and
regulations they administer.
In particularly dramatic exercises of this power, the Obama
Administration publicly announced extensive nonenforcement policies
regarding both marijuana and immigration. Although possessing or
distributing marijuana remains a federal crime, the Department of Justice
issued guidance indicating that federal prosecutors generally would not
devote resources to enforcing federal narcotics laws against parties
operating in compliance with state law. Similarly, in two controversial
programs (one ultimately blocked by a preliminary injunction), the
Department of Homeland Security invited broad categories of
undocumented immigrants to apply for “deferred action,” a two- or
three-year promise of non-deportation that entailed eligibility for work
authorization and other potential benefits. The Trump Administration has
revoked this marijuana guidance. It hopes also to terminate the Obama
Administration’s deferred action program, although a court has
temporarily barred it from doing so. Yet the Trump Administration itself
has slackened enforcement in many areas of regulation, from
environmental law to healthcare and labor, that might well encourage
reliance by regulated parties.
All such policies raise difficult reliance concerns because such
policies, like other nonenforcement promises, are formally nonbinding:
1. Summarized and adapted from Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement,
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (2017).
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in the marijuana and immigration examples, for instance, the policy
documents made clear that they guaranteed nothing. Yet as a practical
matter, such policies may well encourage legal violations. Again, the
marijuana and immigration policies dramatically illustrate the point: both
policies effectively invited millions of people, many of them legally
unsophisticated, to take significant legal risks. If the government resumes
enforcement, marijuana entrepreneurs could be guilty of multiple federal
crimes with stiff penalties, while deferred action applicants will have
provided the government with a removal case “on a platter,” as one
scholar has put it.2
At present, this reliance question is governed by an untidy and
undertheorized set of cases holding that due process bars enforcement in
some circumstances of reliance but not in others. I offer here an account
of this case law and propose an organizing principle for the doctrine.
Although key decisions have often framed the issue in terms of intuitive
unfairness, in fact, reliance defenses require balancing separation of
powers concerns against considerations of individual fair notice. On the
one hand, protecting individual reliance on promised nonenforcement
would enable executive officials to wipe away substantive laws, a result
that would defy the basic separation of powers principle that executive
officials can alter substantive legal obligations only if Congress has
delegated authority to do so. On the other hand, failing to protect
individual reliance risks punishing individuals for conduct that they
lacked fair notice was subject to sanction.
On the whole, without quite framing the issue in these terms, existing
case law has struck this balance in favor of enforceability and against
individual reliance, while at the same time carving out a narrow
exception in some cases when enforcement officials invited unlawful
conduct with assurances of legality rather than mere promises of
nonenforcement. Federal courts thus have sometimes protected reliance
when official assurances involved at least an apparent exercise of
delegated interpretive authority to determine legal meaning or when
executive officials held authority to enlist private parties in government
operations not subject to generally applicable legal prohibitions. In
contrast, courts have generally rejected reliance on promised
nonenforcement—even when doing so results in acute unfairness—when
officials made no representation that conduct was lawful and promised
only to exercise their discretion not to prosecute.

2. Mary D. Fan, Legalization Conflicts and Reliance Defenses, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 907, 939-40 (2015).
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Far from tracking any intuitive notion of fundamental fairness, this
pattern of case results ultimately reflects the important separation-ofpowers principle, accepted even by most proponents of broad
nonenforcement policies, that enforcement discretion entails authority to
ignore completed violations but not to excuse, in advance, future ones.
With the doctrine framed in these terms, I give it an uneasy defense.
Historically, executive authority to cancel legal prohibitions was known
as the “suspending” or “dispensing” power, and though English
monarchs exercised this authority, the Constitution repudiates it by
requiring that Presidents “faithfully execute[]” federal laws. This antisuspending rule—that, absent more specific legislative delegation,
executive officials have discretion over which violations to pursue, but
not over whether conduct violates the law in the first place—forms an
important constitutional background principle against which Congress
legislates. The principle preserves ultimate legislative responsibility for
the content of law (or at least the scope of interpretive delegations to
executive agencies), and it enables creation of regulatory structures that
leverage limited enforcement resources to achieve broader societal
compliance with substantive law.
A broad reliance defense would undermine this separation-of-powers
principle by creating a legislatively unauthorized suspending power by
operation of due process: executive officials could eliminate legal
prohibitions simply by inducing reliance on promised nonenforcement.
Courts have properly precluded this result by cabining the contexts in
which reliance will receive legal protection. To put the point most
sharply, individuals who accept any invitation by the President or
executive officials to undertake illegal conduct must do so at their peril.
Due process cannot normally shield them from future enforcement.
Yet if limits on reliance defenses thus advance separation-of-powers
values, framing reliance defenses in terms of a balance between fair
notice and separation of powers may help identify additional contexts,
like cases involving mistaken assurances of legality, in which the balance
should tip the other way. This inquiry carries the inevitable imprecision
of all incommensurate balancing tests: it involves, to some degree,
assessing “whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy.”3 Nevertheless, I suggest several types of cases in which more
limited separation-of-powers costs or more acute fairness concerns may
justify broader legal protection for reliance.
3. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing a balancing test as applied to the dormant Commerce
Clause).
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Civil and Administrative Estoppel: One limited reform is that
federal courts should reconsider their current hostility to case-specific
estoppel claims outside the criminal context. Lower courts appear to
have applied the due process defense based on mistaken legal assurances
only in criminal cases. More generally, despite the Supreme Court’s
refusal to close the door completely on civil and administrative estoppel,
federal courts almost never accept such claims. Some recent “fair notice”
cases in the administrative context, however, have drawn lines similar to
those suggested by criminal due process case law, and in any event the
same due process principles of fair warning should logically extend
beyond criminal law to other penal sanctions. An analogous defense thus
should apply in appropriate civil- and administrative-penalty cases—
albeit with the same limits and qualifications as in the criminal context.
Thus, to be concrete, in limited circumstances when regulated parties can
plausibly claim genuine confusion about the law, even formally
nonbinding no-action letters and advisory opinions from enforcement
agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission might sometimes
support an anti-entrapment estoppel defense. So too should assurances
provided through IRS help lines and other official sources accessible to
everyday citizens seeking to comply with the law as best they can.
Provision of Information: When the government obtains
information by assuring nonenforcement, due process principles of fair
notice should limit the government’s use of that information in future
enforcement efforts. That is so because, in this context, fairness concerns
are particularly acute, while the cost of transgressing the separation of
powers is limited when the government may still pursue the substantive
violations in question by other means. For example, to apply for deferred
action under the Obama Administration’s programs, individual
immigrants were required to provide identifying information, such as
their names and addresses, and document that they met specified
eligibility criteria. Immigrants provided such information, which
effectively handed the government a deportation case against them,
based on assurances the information would not be used against them.
Though formally nonbinding, such assurances invited reliance in a far
more focused and consequential way than a typical nonenforcement
policy, and allowing use of such information is not necessary to preserve
the primacy of underlying substantive laws over revocable enforcement
policies: power to revoke deferred action itself suffices to prevent a de
facto suspension of statutory requirements. Accordingly, due process
should generally bar using application information against beneficiaries
of these deferred-action programs.
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Secondary Violations: A reliance defense might also be plausible
with respect to legal prohibitions ancillary to the primary prohibition that
executive officials indicated they were unlikely to enforce. The federal
Controlled Substances Act, for example, not only prohibits possession
and distribution of controlled substances—including marijuana—but also
prohibits knowingly and intentionally leasing or otherwise making
property available for use in drug operations. The government has
accordingly threatened landlords with criminal prosecution, civil
penalties, or forfeiture based on tenants’ operation of illegal businesses,
including state-licensed marijuana dispensaries, on their property. Much
as with information disclosure, however, individual reliance interests are
acute in this context, as the federal government’s marijuana
nonenforcement policy may have led landlords and others to perceive
entering leases or other contracts with marijuana dispensaries as no
different from doing so with respect to other ostensibly lawful
businesses. At the same time, the separation-of-powers costs to
protecting reliance are attenuated given the government’s ability to
vindicate statutory policies by pursuing those who have violated the law
directly. Thus, again, at least in suitably compelling cases, the claim of
individual unfairness should prevail over countervailing separation-ofpowers concerns about executive licensing of unlawful conduct.
Congressional Nonenforcement: A further implication of my
analysis is that courts should recognize broader reliance defenses with
respect to congressionally mandated nonenforcement, as opposed to
nonenforcement adopted by enforcement agencies on their own
initiative. If anxieties about enabling executive dispensations from
substantive law properly explain courts’ reluctance to recognize reliance
defenses based on nonenforcement decisions, courts should be more
solicitous of individual fairness concerns—and thus more willing to
recognize legal protections for reliance—when such separation of powers
anxieties are inapplicable because Congress, rather than the executive
branch alone, has mandated the nonenforcement. Congress does so
routinely by denying appropriations to enforce disfavored regulations,
and it has done so recently through recurrent riders barring the use of
Justice Department funds to prosecute state-compliant medical marijuana
users and distributors. Because Congress may sometimes have sound
reasons to proceed through appropriations rather than substantive legal
changes, a blanket estoppel rule would be inappropriate in this context.
Courts may, however, consider reliance claims case-by-case and protect
reliance when it was reasonable under the circumstances.
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Policy-based Desuetude: Due process may also protect reliance
when an overt nonenforcement policy has persisted without change or
apparent violation over an extended period of time. As we have seen, the
balance between separation of powers compliance and individual
reliance generally must favor the former at the expense of the latter, so as
to avoid creating an executive suspending power by operation of due
process. At some point, however, the balance should tip the other way, at
least with respect to malum prohibitum offenses like drug prohibition. If
the government effectively creates a settled expectation of legality by
adhering over a lengthy period to an overt policy of nonenforcement, due
process should eventually bar retrospective enforcement in violation of
the policy—notwithstanding the significant cost to congressional
lawmaking authority that results. Accordingly, had the Trump
Administration (or a Clinton Administration) chosen to continue the
Obama Administration’s marijuana and immigration policies instead of
revoking them, courts might have concluded after a sufficiently lengthy
period (I propose fifteen years) that due process precluded disruption of
resulting nonenforcement expectations.
* * *
Due process principles may thus mitigate at the margins some harsh
effects of the general rule that nonenforcement reliance cannot receive
constitutional protection. The tradeoffs involved in balancing fairness
and separation of powers are necessarily messy and contestable. As a
general matter, as courts have by and large recognized, this balance
should tilt against protecting reliance. Protecting individual reliance in all
cases, or even when concerns about fair notice are substantial, would
undermine important legal limits on enforcement officials’ authority by
giving them effective power to authorize legal violations. Nevertheless,
in at least some situations—when the government pursues violations
despite authoritatively deeming conduct lawful; when it relies on
particular information obtained by promising nonenforcement, or when it
pursues violations prohibited only as a secondary means of implementing
unenforced primary prohibitions; when Congress, rather than an
enforcement agency alone, has mandated nonenforcement; or when an
overt nonenforcement policy has persisted without revision or salient
violations for an extended period—the balance should tip the other way
and give due process protection to reliance.

